The paper will have three sections. In section one I briefly present and respond to Byrne’s argument against theological realism. In section two, I present van Fraassen’s argument against analytic metaphysics and I show how, if sound, it constitutes a reason to reject both metaphysical and theological realism. In section three, I show how van Fraassen can be answered. Obviously what I am doing here falls far short of a full-blown defense of realism in either metaphysics or theology. But (...) the objections raised by van Fraassen and Byrne are tokens of a type of objection that I think is rather widely endorsed among those who are suspicious of these two brands of realism. Thus, responding to those objections constitutes an important first step in the direction of a defense. (shrink)

RESUMO A alimentação é o fator que mais onera um sistema de produção animal. Assim, a utilização de diferentes estratégias de alimentação dos animais ainda é o grande desafio da nutrição animal, principalmente, levando em consideração as exigências nutricionais de diferentes categorias de ruminantes, em especial bovinos em regiões tropicais, haja vista que a sazonalidade na produção de forragens afeta diretamente a produção bovina, promovendo inadequação no atendimento das exigências nutricionais dos animais principalmente em minerais e vitaminas. Uma alimentação que (...) não atenda as exigências nutricionais dos ruminantes gera prejuízos no sistema de produção, além de, em casos mais graves, ocasionar a perda do animal. Estudos que abordam o efeito e a importância de vitaminas e minerais na nutrição bovina são escassos e necessários. Recentemente a National Research Council (NRC) apresentou novos registros das exigências nutricionais das vitaminas e minerais. Essas alterações proporcionam um impacto econômico significativo em relação à nutrição animal. Nesse sentido, objetivou-se com esta revisão trazer informações acerca de vitaminas e minerais na nutrição de bovinos em pastejo. -/- Palavras-chave: Alimentação animal; forragem; pastagem; requerimentos nutricionais; ruminantes; vitaminas lipossolúveis (Source: AGROVOC). -/- ABSTRACT Animal feed is the factor that most burdens a production system. Thus, the use of different animal feeding strategies is still the great challenge of animal nutrition, taking into account the nutritional requirements of different categories of ruminants, especially cattle in tropical regions, given that seasonality in forage production directly affects cattle production, promoting inadequacy in meeting the nutritional requirements of animals, mainly in minerals and vitamins. A diet that does not meet the nutritional requirements of ruminants generates losses in the production system, in addition to, in more serious cases, causing the loss of the animal. Studies that address the effect and importance of vitamins and minerals in bovine nutrition are scarce and necessary. Recently the National Research Council (NRC) presented new records of the nutritional requirements of vitamins and minerals. These changes provide a significant economic impact on animal nutrition. In this sense, the objective of this review was to bring information about vitamins and minerals in the nutrition of grazing cattle. -/- Keywords: Animal feeding; fat soluble vitamins; forage; nutritional requirements; pasture feeding; ruminants (Source: AGROVOC). -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- 1. Cavalcanti CPL, Silva e Macedo TJ, Gois GC, Menezes VG, Monte APO, Silva AD, Silva DJM, Silva EO, Araújo GGL, Rodrigues RTS, Wischral A, Matos MHT, Queiroz MAA. Licuri oil improves feedlot performance and modifies ruminal fauna of Santa Inês ewes. Liv Sci. 2022; 265:e105093. 2. Busato KC, Chizzotti ML, Rodrigues RTS, Silva TS, Silva IF, Queiroz MAA, Silva KT, Borges JC, Gois GC. Ingestive behavior and growth performance of boer crossbred and indigenous goat kids under different feeding levels in Semiarid Region in Brazil. Trop Agric Res. 2022; 33:299-309. 3. Patton J, Dineen M, Keady TWJ, McGee M, Waters S. Developments in nutrition for pasture-based cattle and sheep systems in Ireland. Irish J Agric Food Res. 2022; 61(1):12-37. 4. McAllister TA, Stanford K, Chaves AV, Evans PR, Figueiredo, EES, Ribeiro G. Nutrition, feeding and management of beef cattle in intensive and extensive production systems. Chapter 5. In: Bazer FW, Lamb GC, Wu G, editors. Animal Agriculture. Sustainability, Challenges and Innovations. 1st ed. Elsevier Inc.: Academic Press; 2020. 5. Byrne L, Murphy RA. Relative bioavailability of trace minerals in production animal nutrition: A review. Anim. 2022; 12:e1981. 6. Arthington JD, Ranches J. Trace mineral nutrition of grazing beef cattle. Anim. 2021; 11:e2767. 7. Silva NCD, Martins TLT, Borges I. Efeito dos microminerais na alimentação de ruminantes. Ci Anim. 2017; 27:75-98. 8. Tufarelli V, Ragni M, Laudadio V. Feeding forage in poultry: A promising alternative for the future of production systems. Agric. 2018; 8:1-10. 9. Elgersma A, Søegaard K, Jensen SK. Fatty acids, α-tocopherol, β-carotene, and lutein contents in forage legumes, forbs, and a grass–clover mixture. J Agric Food Chem. 2013; 61:11913–11920. 10. Collet SG, Demeda MA, Taffarel GV, Taffarel L, Girardini LK, Nesi CNH, et al. Efeito de um suplemento mineral traço e vitaminas A e E injetáveis sobre a produção e composição de leite em vacas Holandesas. Rev Ci Agrovet. 2017; 16:463-472. 11. Silva NCD, Martins TLT, Borges I. Macrominerais: Deficiências E Interações Com A Produção E Nutrição De Ruminantes. Scient Agr Paranaensis. 2018; 17:263-271. 12. Danieli B, Schogor ALB. Uso de aditivos na nutrição de ruminantes: revisão. Vet Zootec. 2020; 27:1-13. 13. Goff JP. Invited review: Mineral absorption mechanisms, mineral interactions that affect acid–base and antioxidant status, and diet considerations to improve mineral status. J Dairy Sci. 2018; 101:2763–2813. 14. NRC. National Research Council. Nutrient requirements of beef cattle. 8th ed.Washington, DC.: The National Academy Press; 2016. 15. Silva LFC, Valadares Filho SC, Engle TE, Rotta PP, Marcondes MI, Silva FAZ, et al. Macrominerals and trace element requirements for beef cattle. Plus One. 2015; 10:e0144464. 16. Miranda MMF, Ferrarezi Junior E, Cavichioli FA. Boas práticas agropecuárias: Os benefícios da suplementação alimentar em ruminantes. Int Tec. 2021; 18:455-465. 17. Bhanderi BM, Goswami A, Garg MR, Samanta S. 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Commun Soil Sci Plant An. 2020; 51:2001-2021. 23. Byrne L, Murphy RA. Relative bioavailability of trace minerals in production animal nutrition: A review. Anim. 2022. 12:e1981. 24. Valentim JK, Mendes JP, Przybulinski BB, Serpa FC, Barbosa DK, Castilho VAR, et al. Fatores nutricionais aplicados à reprodução de ruminantes. Rev Uniciên. 2019; 23:77-82. 25. Martins KPF, Fonseca TRS, Silva ES, Munhoz TCP, Dias, GHS, Glauco JN, et al. Bócio em bovino. Pesq Vet Bras. 2018; 38:1030-1037. 26. González-Montaña JR, Escalera-Valente F, Alonso AJ, Lomillos JM, Robles R, Alonso ME. Relationship between vitamin B12 and cobalt metabolism in domestic ruminant: An update. Anim. 2020; 10:e1855; 27. Ventura RA, Cuzzuol GD, Silva TB, Malegoni ACS, Roque LZ, OLiveira SFC, et al. Deficiência de cobalto em bovinos: Revisão. Pubvet. 2021; 15:1-4. 28. Lopes HOS. Suplementação de Baixo Custo para Bovinos Mineral e Alimentar. 1st ed. Brasília, DF: Embrapa Cerrados; 1998. 29. Paul SH, Usman AA, Gana IN, Manase A, Adeniyi OD, Olutoye MA. Comparative study of mineral and nutritional composition of a multifunctional flora composite formulated from seven medicinal plants and their applications to human health. Eng Techn Open Access J. 2018; 1:137-150. 30. Zhou J, Zhang J, Xue B, Yue S, Yang C, Xue B. Effects of premating calcium and phosphorus supplementation on reproduction efficiency of grazing yak heifers. Anim. 2021; 11:1-9. 31. Harder H, Khol-Parisini A, Metzler-Zebeli BU, Klevenhusen F, Zebeli Q. Treatment of grain with organic acids at 2 different dietary phosphorus levels modulates ruminal microbial community structure and fermentation patterns in vitro. J Dairy Sci. 2015; 98:8107–8120. 32. Jain RK, Mudgal V. Phosphorus deficiency influences rumen microbial activity: Review. Int J Zoo Anim Biol. 2021; 4:1-9. 33. Barreto JC, Branco AF, Santos GT, Magalhães VJA, Coneglian SMC, Teixeira S. Avaliação dos efeitos de fontes de fósforo na dieta sobre parâmetros do meio ruminal e eficiência de síntese microbiana, digestibilidade dos nutrientes e fósforo plasmático em bovinos. Rev Bras Zootec. 2009; 38:760-769. 34. Yamada S, Inaba M. Potassium metabolism and management in patients with CKD. Nutr. 2021; 13:1-19. 35. Martinsen TC, Fossmark R, Waldum HL. The phylogeny and biological function of gastric juice—Microbiological consequences of removing gastric acid. Int J Mol Sci. 2019; 20:1-22. 36. González FHD, Silva SC. Minerais e vitaminas no metabolismo animal. 1st ed. Porto Alegre: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul; 2019. 37. Melo RR, Gonçalves SLS, Baccarin FJB, Vasconcelos WA, Miranda SC. Influência de altas dosagens de cloreto de potássio no desenvolvimento de espécies em cultivo hidropônico. Pubvet. 2020; 14:1-9. 38. Araújo WAG, Rostagno HS, Albino LFT, Carvalho TA, Ribeiro Neto AC. Potássio na nutrição animal. Rev Eletr Nutr. 2010; 7:1280-1291. 39. NRC. National Research Council. Nutrient requeriments of dairy cattle. 8th ed. Washinton, DC.: The National Academy Press; 2021. 40. Palomares RA. Trace Minerals Supplementation with Great Impact on Beef Cattle Immunity and Health. Anim. 2022; 12:e2839. 41. Tariq M, Abbas G, Ahmad S, Mustafa R, Sultan H, Abdullah M, Hussain I, Arshad M, Cheema UB, Hassan SU. Effect of supplementation of minerals on the productive and reproductive performance of lactating cattle and buffalo. Pakistan J Sci. 2022; 74:e425. 42. Pagno KCA Barbosa JD, Salvarani FM, Bomjardim HA, Faial KCF, Souza RS, Gava A, Perotta JH, Barros Filho IR. Micromineral concentrations (copper, cobalt, iron, molybdenum and zinc) in the liver of dairy cows from Campos Gerais Region, Paraná state, Brazil. Pesq Vet Bras. 2023; 43:e07137. 43. Jeong H, Vacanti NM. Systemic vitamin intake impacting tissue proteomes. Nut Met. 2020; 17:1-16. 44. Spears JW, Weiss WP. Invited Review: Mineral and vitamin nutrition in ruminants. Appl Anim Sci. 2014; 30:180-191. 45. Erickson PS, Kalscheur KF. Nutrition and feeding of dairy cattle. Chapter 9. (pp. 157-180). In: Bazer FW, Lamb GC, Wu G, editors. Animal Agriculture. Sustainability, Challenges and Innovations. 1st ed. Elsevier Inc.: Academic Press; 2020. 46. Kareem MM, Jabir MS. Vitamins. Chapter 3. In: Imran M, Imran A, editors. Malnutrition. 1st ed. London, UK.: IntechOpen; 2020. 47. Akram M, Munir N, Daniyal M, Egbuna C, Găman MA, Onyekere PF, et al. Vitamins and minerals: Types, sources and their functions. Chapter 9. (pp 149–172). In: Egbuna C, Tupas GD, editors. Functional foods and nutraceuticals. Switzerland, AG.: Springer, Cham; 2020. 48. Marino CT, Medeiros SR. Minerais e vitaminas na nutrição de bovinos de corte. Chapter 6. (pp. 79-93). In. Medeiros SR, Gomes RC, Bungenstab DJ, editors. Nutrição de bovinos de corte: fundamentos e aplicações. Brasília, DF: Embrapa; 2015. 49. Hodnik JJ, Ježek J, Starič J. A review of vitamin D and its importance to the health of dairy cattle. J Dairy Res. 2020; 87:84–87. 50. Alves EM, Pedreira MS, Santana CA, Silva FF. Nutrição vitamínica de vacas leiteiras. Pubvet. 2008; 2:1-17. 51. Jiang Q, Lin L, Xie F, Jin W, Zhu W, Wang M, et al. Metagenomic insights into the microbe-mediated B and K2 vitamin biosynthesis in the gastrointestinal microbiome of ruminants. Microb. 2022; 10:1-16. 52. Magan JB, O’Callaghan TF, Zheng J, Zhang L, Mandal R, Hennessy D, et al. Effect of diet on the vitamin B profile of bovine milk-based protein ingredients. Foods. 2020; 9:1-17. 53. Pinedo LA, Berenchtein B, Selem ASMA. Estudo dos processos bioquímicos da fermentação, degradação e absorção de nutrientes dos alimentos em ruminantes. Pubvet. 2008; 2:1-10. 54. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Formulação e Avaliação de Suplemento Mineral Para Caprinos. Instrução Técnica Para o Produtor Rural de Pernambuco, v. 3, n. 1, p. 1-4, 2023. 55. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Nutrição Sobre a Reprodução e Fertilidade dos Bovinos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2021. 56. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Suplementação e formulação de sal mineral e mistura múltipla para bovinos. Revista Universitária Brasileira, v. 2, n. 1, 2024. (shrink)

There is a basic distinction, in the realm of spatial boundaries, between bona fide boundaries on the one hand, and fiat boundaries on the other. The former are just the physical boundaries of old. The latter are exemplified especially by boundaries induced through human demarcation, for example in the geographic domain. The classical problems connected with the notions of adjacency, contact, separation and division can be resolved in an intuitive way by recognizing this two-sorted ontology of boundaries. Bona fide boundaries (...) yield a notion of contact that is effectively modeled by classical topology; the analogue of contact involving fiat boundaries calls, however, for a different account, based on the intuition that fiat boundaries do not support the open/closed distinction on which classical topology is based. In the presence of this two-sorted ontology it then transpires that mereotopology—topology erected on a mereological basis—is more than a trivial formal variant of classical point-set topology. (shrink)

Are women (simply) adult human females? Dictionaries suggest that they are. However, philosophers who have explicitly considered the question invariably answer no. This paper argues that they are wrong. The orthodox view is that the category *woman* is a social category, like the categories *widow* and *police officer*, although exactly what this social category consists in is a matter of considerable disagreement. In any event, orthodoxy has it that *woman* is definitely not a biological category, like the categories *amphibian* or (...) *adult human female*. -/- In the first part, a number of arguments are given for the view that women are adult human females; the second part turns to rebutting the main objections. Finally, a couple of morals are briefly noted: one for activist sloganeering, and one for ameliorative projects that seek to change the meaning of ‘woman’. (shrink)

We discuss at some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a (...) type of awareness called phenomenal awareness constitute the phenomenal content of experience. The phenomenal content of perception contains the existence of objects as separate things that persist in time and time, spatiotemporal information, and information regarding relative spatial relations, motion, surface properties, shape, size, orientation, color, and their functional properties. (shrink)

There are conflicting intuitions concerning the status of a boundary separating two adjacent entities (or two parts of the same entity). The boundary cannot belong to both things, for adjacency excludes overlap; and it cannot belong to neither, for nothing lies between two adjacent things. Yet how can the dilemma be avoided without assigning the boundary to one thing or the other at random? Some philosophers regard this as a reductio of the very notion of a boundary, which should accordingly (...) be treated a mere façon de parler. In this paper I resist this temptation and examine some ways of taking the puzzle at face value within a realist perspective—treating boundaries as ontologically on a par with (albeit parasitic upon) extended parts. (shrink)

The role of evolutionary theory at the origin of life is an extensively debated topic. The origin and early development of life is usually separated into a prebiotic phase and a protocellular phase, ultimately leading to the Last Universal Common Ancestor. Most likely, the Last Universal Common Ancestor was subject to Darwinian evolution, but the question remains to what extent Darwinian evolution applies to the prebiotic and protocellular phases. In this review, we reflect on the current status of evolutionary theory (...) in origins of life research by bringing together philosophy of science, evolutionary biology, and empirical research in the origins field. We explore the various ways in which evolutionary theory has been extended beyond biology; we look at how these extensions apply to the prebiotic development of (proto)metabolism; and we investigate how the terminology from evolutionary theory is currently being employed in state-of-the-art origins of life research. In doing so, we identify some of the current obstacles to an evolutionary account of the origins of life, as well as open up new avenues of research. (shrink)

That parthood is a transitive relation is among the most basic principles of classical mereology. Alas, it is also very controversial. In a recent paper, Ingvar Johansson has put forward a novel diagnosis of the problem, along with a corresponding solution. The diagnosis is on the right track, I argue, but the solution is misleading. And once the pieces are properly put together, we end up with a reinforcement of the standard defense of transitivity on behalf of classical mereology.

Are there any bona fide boundaries, i.e., boundaries that carve at the joints? Or is any boundary —hence any object—the result of a fiat articulation reflecting our cognitive biases and our so-cial practices and conventions? Does the choice between these two options amount to a choice between realism and wholesome relativism?

Comment on Brogaard's Seeing and Saying (OUP 2018).

A Letter to the Editor about the origin of "gender identity" and deficiencies in its current definition.

When one visually hallucinates, the object of one’s hallucination is not before one’s eyes. On the standard view, that is because the object of hallucination does not exist, and so is not anywhere. Many different defenses of the standard view are on offer; each have problems. This paper defends the view that there is always an object of hallucination—a physical object, sometimes with spatiotemporally scattered parts.

A critical review of the main themes arising out of recent literature on the semantics of ordinary event talk. The material is organized in four sections: (i) the nature of events, with emphasis on the opposition between events as particulars and events as universals; (ii) identity and indeterminacy, with emphasis on the unifier/multiplier controversy; (iii) events and logical form, with emphasis on Davidson’s treatment of the form of action sentences; (iv) linguistic applications, with emphasis on issues concerning aspectual phenomena, the (...) telicity/atelicity distinction, the treatment of statives, and temporal quantification. (shrink)

This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one's own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one's intentions.

This paper investigates the prospects of Rodney Brooks’ proposal for AI without representation. It turns out that the supposedly characteristic features of “new AI” (embodiment, situatedness, absence of reasoning, and absence of representation) are all present in conventional systems: “New AI” is just like old AI. Brooks proposal boils down to the architectural rejection of central control in intelligent agents—Which, however, turns out to be crucial. Some of more recent cognitive science suggests that we might do well to dispose of (...) the image of intelligent agents as central representation processors. If this paradigm shift is achieved, Brooks’ proposal for cognition without representation appears promising for full-blown intelligent agents—Though not for conscious agents. (shrink)

Assuming that events form a genuine ontological category, shall we say that a good inventory of the world ought to include “negative” events—failures, omissions, things that didn’t happen—along with positive ones? I argue that we shouldn’t. Talk of non-occurring events is like talk of non-existing objects and should not be taken at face value. We often speak as though there were such things, but deep down we want our words to be interpreted in such a way as to avoid serious (...) ontological commitment. (shrink)

One very popular framework in contemporary epistemology is Bayesian. The central epistemic state is subjective confidence, or credence. Traditional epistemic states like belief and knowledge tend to be sidelined, or even dispensed with entirely. Credences are often introduced as familiar mental states, merely in need of a special label for the purposes of epistemology. But whether they are implicitly recognized by the folk or posits of a sophisticated scientific psychology, they do not appear to fit well with perception, as is (...) often noted. -/- This paper investigates the tension between probabilistic cognition and non-probabilistic perception. The tension is real, and the solution—to adapt a phrase from Quine and Goodman—is to renounce credences altogether. (shrink)

This paper examines the evolution of Husserl’s philosophy of nonintuitive intentions. The analysis has two stages. First, I expose a mistake in Husserl’s account of non-intuitive acts from his 1901 Logical Investigations. I demonstrate that Husserl employs the term “signitive” too broadly, as he concludes that all non-intuitive acts are signitive. He states that not only meaning acts, but also the contiguity intentions of perception are signitive acts. Second, I show how Husserl, in his 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Logical (...) Investigation, amends his 1901 theory of non-intuitive acts, which he now calls “empty” intentions. He there accurately distinguishes empty meaning acts from the empty intentions of perception. In the conclusion, I reveal how Husserl’s alterations to his theory of non-intuitive intentions can inform our understanding of a larger shift in his philosophy. (shrink)

According to a popular line of reasoning, diachronic vagueness creates a problem for the endurantist conception of persistence. Some authors have replied that this line of reasoning is inconclusive, since the endurantist can subscribe to a principle of Diachronic Unrestricted Composition (DUC) that is perfectly parallel to the principle required by the perdurantist’s semantic account. I object that the endurantist should better avoid DUC. And I argue that even DUC, if accepted, would fail to provide the endurantist with the necessary (...) resources for explaining diachronic vagueness in familiar semantic terms. (shrink)

This paper examines the evolution of Edmund Husserl’s theory of perceptual occlusion. This task is accomplished in two stages. First, I elucidate Husserl’s conclusion, from his 1901 Logical Investigations, that the occluded parts of perceptual objects are intended by partial signitive acts. I focus on two doctrines of that account. I examine Husserl’s insight that signitive intentions are composed of Gehalt and I discuss his conclusion that signitive intentions sit on the continuum of fullness. Second, the paper discloses how Husserl (...) transforms his 1901 philosophy in his 1913 revisions to the Sixth Logical Investigation, affirming that the occluded parts of perceptual objects are intended by empty contiguity acts. I demonstrate how he overturns the two core doctrines of his theory from the Investigations in these revisions, claiming that empty intentions are not composed of Gehalt and asserting that those acts break with the continuum of fullness. Husserl implements these changes to solve problems that arise from his recognition of two new kinds of intentions; darker and completely dark acts. Finally, in the conclusion, I cash out this analysis, by indicating that, in 1913, Husserl transforms his theory of fulfillment on the basis of his new insights about empty acts. (shrink)

Different authors offer subtly different characterizations of naïve realism. We disentangle the main ones and argue that illusions provide the best proving ground for naïve realism and its main rival, representationalism. According to naïve realism, illusions never involve per- ceptual error. We assess two leading attempts to explain apparent perceptual error away, from William Fish and Bill Brewer, and conclude that they fail. Another lead- ing attempt is assessed in a companion paper, which also sketches an alternative representational account.

This essay examines how Husserl stretches the bounds of his philosophy of meaning, according to which all propositions are categorical, to account for existential propositions, which seem to lack predicates. I examine Husserl’s counterintuitive conclusion that an existential proposition does possess a predicate and I explore his endeavor to pinpoint what that predicate is. This goal is accomplished in three stages. First, I examine Husserl’s standard theory of predication and categorial intuition from his 1901 Logical Investigations. Second, I show how (...) Husserl imposes those 1901 insights to uncover the predicate of the existential proposition in unpublished manuscripts and lectures. He determines that the existential proposition predicates of the subject, that it corresponds to an actual object. This analysis reveals that Husserl’s descriptions of existential propositions from the late 1890s employed both static and genetic methodologies. In those texts, he carefully untangles and clarifies the co-enmeshed passive and active moments of consciousness and shows that the passive givenness of certain circumstances is the condition of possibility for our active verifying of propositions. Finally, I execute a critical assessment of Husserl’s thought to reveal that, while his insights about existential propositions are largely correct, they are augmented by re-construing them within the context of his mature philosophy. Only by renouncing his metaphysical neutrality and by accounting for intersubjectivity, can Husserl properly clarify existential propositions. (shrink)

This paper accomplishes two goals. First, I present a distinct interpretation of the inception of the phenomenology of feelings. I show that Husserl’s first substantial discussion of intentional and non-intentional feelings is not from his 1901 Logical Investigations, but rather his 1893 manuscript, “Notes towards a Theory of Attention and Interest”. Husserl there describes intentional feelings as active and non-intentional feelings as passive. Second, I show that Husserl presents a somewhat unique account of feelings in “Notes”, which is partly different (...) from his later theories of feelings found in Lectures on Ethics and Value Theory and Studies Concerning the Structures of Consciousness. In contrast to those mature writings, in “Notes”, Husserl describes intentional feelings while avoiding cognitivism and he analyses non-intentional feelings without employing the content-apprehension schema. On this basis, I argue that “Notes” is an important untapped resource for constructing original phenomenologies of feelings. (shrink)

According to orthodoxy, perceptual beliefs are caused by perceptual experiences. The paper argues that this view makes it impossible to explain how experiences can be epistemically significant. A rival account, on which experiences in the “good case” are ways of knowing, is set out and defended.

ABSTRACT This essay focuses on two underlying presumptions that impinge on the effort of UNESCO to engender universal agreement on a set of bioethical norms: the conception of universality that pervades much of the document, and its disregard of structural inequalities that significantly impact health. Drawing on other UN system documents and recent feminist bioethics scholarship, we argue that the formulation of universal principles should not rely solely on shared ethical values, as the draft document affirms, but also on differences (...) in ethical values that obtain across cultures. UNESCO's earlier work on gender mainstreaming illustrates the necessity of thinking from multiple perspectives in generating universal norms. The declaration asserts the ‘fundamental equality of all human beings in dignity and rights’1 and insists that ‘the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition’2 yet it does not explicitly recognize disparities of power and wealth that deny equal dignity and rights to many. Without attention to structural (as opposed to merely accidental) inequities, UNESCO's invocation of rights is so abstract as to be incompatible with its avowed intention. (shrink)

How do I know that I see a cat? A curiously under-asked question. The paper tries to answer it.

We can cause windows to break and we can break windows; we can cause villages to flood and we can flood villages; and we can cause chocolate to melt and we can melt chocolate. Each time these can come apart: if, for example, A merely instructs B to break the window, then A causes the window to break without breaking it herself. Each instance of A breaking/flooding/melting/burning/killing/etc. something, is an instance of what I call making. I argue that making is (...) an independent, theoretically important notion—akin but irreducible to causing—and metaphysicians should pay attention to it. (shrink)

Philosophers of mind have distinguished (and sometimes conflated) various qualities. This article tries to sort things out.

How do you know what you want? The question is neglected by epistemologists. This paper attempts an answer.

This paper critically examines color relationalism and color relativism, two theories of color that are allegedly supported by variation in normal human color vision. We mostly discuss color relationalism, defended at length in Jonathan Cohen's The Red and the Real, and argue that the theory has insuperable problems.

This paper accomplishes three goals. First, the essay demonstrates that Edmund Husserl’s theory of meaning consciousness from his 1901 Logical Investigations is internally inconsistent and falls apart upon closer inspection. I show that Husserl, in 1901, describes non-intuitive meaning consciousness as a direct parallel or as a ‘mirror’ of intuitive consciousness. He claims that non-intuitive meaning acts, like intuitions, have substance and represent their objects. I reveal that, by defining meaning acts in this way, Husserl cannot account for our experiences (...) of countersensical, absurd, or impossible meanings. Second, I examine how Husserl came to recognize this 1901 mistake in his 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Logical Investigation. I discuss how he accordingly reformulates his understanding of non-intuitive meaning acts from the ground up in those Revisions, where this also allows for him to properly account for the experience of impossible meanings. Instead of describing them as mirrors of intuitions, Husserl takes non-intuitive meaning acts to be modifications of intuitions, where they have no substance and do not represent their objects. Finally, in the conclusion to this essay, I demonstrate how this fundamental change to his understanding of meaning consciousness forced Husserl to revise other central tenets of his philosophy, such that the trajectory of his thought can only be properly understood in light of these revisions to his theory of non-intuitive meaning consciousness. (shrink)

I propose a new formalist account of legal (/proximate) causation – one that holds legal causation to be a matter of amoral, descriptive fact. The account starts with a metaphysical relation, akin to but distinct from common-sense causation, and it argues that legal causation aligns exactly with that relation; it is unified and principled.

Remembering a cat sleeping (specifically, recollecting the way the cat looked), perceiving (specifically, seeing) a cat sleeping, and imagining (specifically, visualizing) a cat sleeping are of course importantly different. Nonetheless, from the first-person perspective they are palpably alike. The paper addresses two questions: Q1. What are these similarities (and differences)? Q2. How does one tell that one is recalling (and so not perceiving or imagining)?

G.E. Moore said that rightness was obviously a matter of maximising plain goodness. Peter Geach and Judith Thomson disagree. They have both argued that ‘good’ is not a predicative adjective, but only ever an attributive adjective: just like ‘big.’ And just as there is no such thing as plain bigness but only ever big for or as a so-and-so, there is also no such thing as plain goodness. They conclude that Moore’s goodness is thus a nonsense. However attention has been (...) drawn to a weakness in their arguments. Mahrad Almotahari and Adam Hosein have sought to plug that weakness. If their plug holds, then there is no goodness. Doing most of their work is the following premise: adjective φ is predicative only if it can be used predicatively in ‘x is a φ K’ otherwise it is attributive. In this paper I argue that this premise is false, that their plug does not hold and that if one is to reject plain goodness it will have to be for other reasons. (shrink)

At least in one well-motivated sense of ‘concept’, all perception involves concepts, even perception as practiced by lizards and bees. That is because—the paper argues—all perception involves belief.

This book aims to develop certain aspects of Gottlob Frege’s theory of meaning, especially those relevant to intensional logic. It offers a new interpretation of the nature of senses, and attempts to devise a logical calculus for the theory of sense and reference that captures as closely as possible the views of the historical Frege. (The approach is contrasted with the less historically-minded Logic of Sense and Denotation of Alonzo Church.) Comparisons of Frege’s theory with those of Russell and others (...) are given. It is in the end shown that developing Frege’s theory in these ways reveals serious problems hitherto largely unnoticed, including those possibly rendering a Fregean intensional logic inconsistent even if his naïve class theory is excluded. (shrink)

This comment mainly examines Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s preferred framework for examining whether narrow content is viable, arguing that their framework is not well-suited to the task; once a more traditional framework is adopted, Y&H’s case against internalism is strengthened.

This paper offers a more comprehensive and accurate picture of Edmund Husserl’s semiotics. I not only clarify, as many have already done, Husserl’s theory of signs from the 1901 Logical Investigations, but also examine how he transforms that element of his philosophy in the 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Logical Investigation. Specifically, the paper examines the evolution of two central tenets of Husserl’s semiotics. I first look at how he modifies his classification of signs. I disclose why he revised his (...) 1901 distinction between indicators and expressions, instead claiming in 1913/14 that the divisions should be drawn between indicators, signals, and categorial signs. Second, I elucidate why Husserl overturned his conclusion from the Investigations, that signs execute their signitive operations in three steps, because he recognizes that categorial signs and their meant object are experienced all at once. By exploring the transformation of these two tenets of Husserl’s semiotics, we will see that he conceived of the First Investigation only as a starting or jumping off point for future analyses of signitive experience, rather than as his final account. This analysis will further reveal novel insights about Husserl’s understanding of intersubjectivity, passivity, and temporality. (shrink)

Critical discussion of Susanna Schellenberg's account of hallucination and perceptual evidence.

This paper accomplishes two tasks. First, I unpack Husserl’s analysis of interest from his 1893 manuscript, “Notes Towards a Theory of Attention and Interest” to demonstrate that it comprises his first rigorous genetic analysis of attention. Specifically, I explore Husserl’s observations about how attentive interest is passively guided by affections, moods, habits, and cognitive tensions. In doing so, I reveal that the early Husserl described attention as always pulled forward to new discoveries via the rhythmic recurrence of tension and pleasure. (...) Second, I demonstrate that “Notes” is the germ of Husserl’s mature genetic phenomenology of attention. The 1893 analysis provides Husserl with all of the philosophical reasons and tools for the construction of his genetic account of attention in his late works. I then discuss how the disclosure of this novel subterranean link can prompt a rethinking of the development of phenomenology. (shrink)

I consider cases where you increase the risk that, e.g., someone will die, without increasing the risk that you will kill them: in particular, cases in which that increasing of risk is accompanied by a decreasing of risk of the same degree such that the risk imposition has been offset. I defend the moral legitimacy of such offsetting, including carbon-offsetting.

Continuing correspondence on 'gender identity'.

In recent years, pronouns have become a white-hot interface between language and social and political issues. “My pronouns are he/they” signals allegiance to one side in the culture wars, as does “My pronouns are whatever.” But there is surprisingly little philosophical work at this interface; this paper aims to chart the main questions and argue for some answers, with the hope of stimulating more research.

I argue that Universalism (the thesis that mereological composition is unrestricted) entails Extensionalism (the thesis that sameness of composition is sufficient for identity) as long as the parthood relation is transitive and satisfies the Weak Supplementation principle (to the effect that whenever a thing has a proper part, it has another part disjoint from the first).